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SOME POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY LAW.
Although the Public Service Company Law has
been in force almost seven years,1 there are several
false notions widely held as to the powers of the Public
Service Commission, and of the provisions oif the Law.
This is strange in view of the fact that there are few, if
any, citizens of the Coninlonwealth who are not affected
to some degree by the orders of the Commission, and
the operation of the Law.
1. The erroneous opinion which is most widely held
is that the Public Service Commission has power to suspend the operation of a new tariff (filed by a public service company which increases all or some of the rates
which had previously been in effect. This conceptionq
was so widely held, that in the present investigation of
the increased rates of The Bell Telephone Company of
Pennsylvania the Comlmission through several of the
newspapers clearly and succinctly stated the scope of
its powers.
Every public service company has the right in the
first instance to determine the rate, and to change that
"Act of 26 July, 1910, P. L. 1374, effective for all purposee
I January, 1914.
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rate when it deems it necessary. This power is inherent
and a part of its charter grant from the State, and can
be taken from it only by a clear legislative enactment.
The right to suspend. the operation of proposed
rates, pending the determination of their reasonableness, must be clearly granted to a commission by the
legislature or it does not exist. The Commission having
been created by the legislature has only those powers
which have been expressly granted to it; it has no
others.2 The power of suspending the operation of the
new rates pending an investigation has been given by
statute to the Interstate Commerce Commission,3 but
has been withheld from the Public Service Commission
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
In July of 1918, the then Attorney General, Honorable Francis Shunk Brown, was requested by the Commission to 'aidvise it on this question. In an exceedingly
well reasoned opinion he advised,
"that the Public Service Commission does not, under the
law as it now exists, have the power to prevent a pro-

posed change of rates becoming effective

after

thirty

days have elapsed from the filing of such schedule,
pending a hearing as to the reasonableness of the new

rates, but that it may, by general rule, or special order, require the company to furnish its patrons a cer.
:1For instance the Commission has no power to enforce spec'fically a contract made by a public service company and one of

its consumers. Public Service Electric Company vs. Public Utility
Commissioners (1916 N. J.) 96 Atl. 107, P. U.

R. 1916 D, 107.

See also P. R. R. vs. Public Service Commission (1916) 64 Pa.
,Sup. Ct. 586 and Lycoming Edison Company vs. Public Service
Commission (1917) 67 Pa. Sup. Ct. 608, w'here it was held that
the. Commission lacked the power to compel a railroad to build
a private side track.

sSection 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act-Act of 4 Feb.,
1887, 24 Stat. 384, amended 29 June, 1906, 3,J Stat. 599, Act 18
June, 1910, 36 Stat. 551, Act of 9 Aug. 1.917, 40 Stat. 272. The

periods of suspension are 120 days and six months.
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tificate or other evidence of payments made by them in
excess of the prior established rate pending such hearing and determination."

The reasoning and 'conclusion of this opinion were
adopted by the Superior Court in City of Scranton vs.
Public Service Commission4 where Judge Keller remarked:
"That it was the intention of the legislature that the
rate established by the public service company should
take effect and be collectible pending a determination by
the Commission as to its reasonableness, is seen from
the fact that the act provides for a refund in case the
Commission fixes a lower rate and fails to give the
Commission power to suspend rates duly filed, posted
and pdblished."

This conclusion is not only sound as a legal proposition, but is also just. The consumers are amply protected in case the rates in the new tariff are determined to
be unjust and unreasonable by the Commission.
Under Article II, Section 1 (f) and Article V, Section 4 of the Public Service Company Law, the Commission has the power to order a public service company to
give to each of its customers "a certificate or other evidence of payments" for the excess of the new rates under attack over the old rates. Such a certificate protects the consumers for if the proposed rates are deternined to be unjust and unreasonable and the old
rates are reinstatek the consumers can present these
4(1919) 8 Pa. Corp. Rep. 321. See also the language of Mr.
Justice Simpson in New York & Penna. Co, vs. New York Central Railroad, No. 154 E. D., January Term, 1920, decided 15
March, 1920, but not yet reported. But compare Suburban Water
Co. vs. Borough of Oakmont, No. 70, October Term, W. D. 1919,
now before the Supreme Court on re-argument, where the Allegheny County Court held that the rate under attack could not
be enforced in an action at law against a borough pending the
final determination of the reasonableness of the rate by the Commission. It is submitted that this ruling is erroneous.
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certificates as their evidence of excess payments over
the .prior established rate in the petitions to the Commission for reparation. 5
While the Commission has this power to order the
company to issue such certificates, yet it will not exercise it in every ease. There is no general order of the
Commission which requires a company to issue such
certificates and where no necessity exists for the issuance of the certificates, no specific order will be
made. In Mount Carmel vs. Edison Electric Illuminating
Company6 the Commission ruled that where a company
furnishes each consumer with a receipt which shows
the ammount which was paid Ifor the service under the
new rate, it will not order the company to furnish certificates of excess payment. This ruling is reasonable
for if the new rates are stricken off and the old rates
re-established, each consumer can readily determine
the amount which he was over-charged and compel the
company to refund to him this amount.
The same is true if the ConlMission in determining
that the proposed rates are unjust and unreasonable
does not order the old rates to be effective, but new
rates which are less than the proposed rates.
Such procedure not only protects the consumers if
the new rates are determined to be unjust and unreasonable, but also protects the company if the new rates
are determined to be just and reasonable. This was aptly stated by Attorney General Brown in the opinion to
which reference has already been made:
sArt. V, Section 5 of the Public Service Company Law.
However, the petition for reparation must be filed with the
Commission "within two years from the time when the cause of
action accrued," i. e., two years from the date of the order declaring the new rates unreasonable and unjust.
6(1.918) 6 PTa. Corp. Rep. 552.
GaSuch a thought runs through the opinion of -the lower
court in Suburban Water Company vs. Borough of Oakmont,
supra note 4.
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"On the other hand, there would be no practicable
method of reinbursing the company if the old rates
were continued until the hearing was completed and
then it was determined by the Commission that the new
rates, as proposed, were just and reasonable; and a suspension of the new schedule until such determination
might thus prove disasterous to the company, whic~h is
expressly authorized to 'demand, collect and receive fair,
just and reasonable rates, fares, tolls and charges' (Article III, Section 1)."

2. Many are of the opinion that a public service
company must apply to and receive from the Commfission its approval of the new tafriff, whether the rate is
increased or decreased, before such tariff can go into
effet.f Nothingis farther from thefact. Thousands of
tariffs and supplements to tariffs are filed annually and
if the Commission were required to act upon each one
before it finally became effective, the Conimission
would have little time to perform its regularatory duties.
Every public service cormpany has the right 7 to
change any tariff or rate which it has filed by merely
giving both the Com~mission and its consumers the required statutory notice of thirty days" before the date
the new tariff becomes effective. If the new tariff or
supplement 9 is in proper form it is filed by the Bureau
of Rates and Tariffs of the Cornission as a matter of
cnurse. 0 If the tariff or supplement is not in proper
TArt. H, Section 1 (f) of Public Service Company Law.
sThis same section gives the Commission power to allow tariffs
to become effective upon less than thirty days' notice, if good
cause is shown.
9
When the company wishes to change one particular rate or
class of rates in a tariff, it file sa supplement to that tariff which
changes only that particular rate or rates and no other rates.
-oCircular No. 5, and Tariff Circulars Nos. 5 and 6, of the
Commission contain the rules for'the form .of tariff, and filing,
posting and giving of notices.
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form it is not accepted by the Bureau for filing. But this
rejecbion is based on what may be called a failure to
observe the rules of procedure. It cannot be rejected by
the Bureau because the Bureau is of the opinion that
either the rules or the rates of the crnpany as contained in the new tariff are unjust, unreasonable, unjustly
discriminatory or unduly preferential. Unless such mat.
ters are brought before the Comnission either by a
fornmal or informal complaint, the tariff will remain as
it was filed. It can be changed only by the voluntary
action olf the company or by an order of the Commission
after a hearing -has been held.
To this broad rule there is but one exception., In
Article II, Section 1 (f) it is provided:
"That no rate, practice or classification which shall
have been determined by the commission shall be
changed or discontinued by the public service company,
directly or through any change in classifications, rules,
regulations, contracts, or practices, within a period of
three years after such determination, without application to and the approval of the commission, of which
epplication thirty days' prior notice shall be given in
the said tariffs or schedules to the public."

The reason for this proviso is clear. After an attack has been matte on the rates of a public service company and those rates have been determined either just
and reasonable, or unjust and unreasonable, there
should be a "period of repose." No change should be
made in the determined rate without the express approval of the Commission. The consumers could not
force a change in the rate as determined except by
filing a new complaint. And this proviso deprives the
company from exercising its otherwise unqualified
right to change the rate within a period of three years.
The dificulty is however, to know when a rate has
been "determined" by the Commission. It is not every
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action of the Commission with respect to a rate under
attack which makes that rate a "determined" rate.
For example: A public service company files a
tariff increasing rates whioh, will become effective after
the statutory thirty days' notice to the public and the
Commission. During that statutory period a coemplaint
is filed against the rates alleging they are unjust and
unreasonable. At the hearing the burden of proving
that the new rates are just and reasonable is upon the
public service company. After the public service company has introduced its evidence in support of the new
rate, the complainant offers evidence to rebut it. If the
Commission should determine that the new rates were
unjust and unreasonable and order the company to install the old rates, there is no doubt that these rates
are such as "have been determined," and they cannot
be changed within three years without application to
and approval by the Commission."
On the other hand, suppose that the complainant
refuses to prosecute the complaint after the company
has introduced its prima facie case, and the complaint
liAshland vs. Schuylkill Railway Company (1918) 6 P. C. R.
585. In New Castle vs. Mahoning and Shenango Railway and
Light Company (1919) 7 P. C. R. 139, the Commission went
further. The Commission had ordered a prior complaint to be
dismissed and the company "permitted to collect its rates filed
with the Commission" until a certain date after which the old
rates were to be installed, unless the company could then show
that it required "the revenue which the new rates produce." Although there was no specific finding that the new rates were just
and reasonable, yet the Commission held that its former report
and order "was a determination of the just and reasonable rates
which the respondent company was entitled to collect," and that
these rates could not be changed within three years without application to and approval by the Commission. But quaere: Can
-any rate be said to "have been determined" by a report and oraer of the Commission in which it does not affirmatively appear
that the rates under attack are either unjust and unreasonable,
etc., or just and reasonable, etc?
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is merely dismissed by the Comnission. Is this a deterrmination of the new rates? Clearly not. There has been
no adjudication of the rates. Nothing has been decided
or determined. The complaint was dismissed -because
the complainant refused to prosecute his complaint. Although the dismissal of the complaint permits the company to continue charging the new rates, yet the action
of the Commission did not "determine" its rates. If it
were otherwise any one 'by filing a complaint within the
statutory period of thirty days could seriously embarrass and deprive every public service company of its
undoubted right to change its rates upon giriing the required notice. Inasmuch as the comlaint is made within the thirty days' 'period, the burden of proof is upon
the company. The complainant is not compelled to produce one scintilla of evidence until the company has offered its evidence in support of its new rates. If the
complainant then refuses to go on with the case, it is
clear why the dismissal of such a complaint should not
be regarded as a determination -thatthe new rates were
just and reasonable and so restrict the company from
changing those rates for a period of three years except
upon application to the Commission. To hold that rates
in such cases were 'tetermined by the Commission"
would open the door to suspicious complaints.
The Commission has lately advised that in such
cases, the rates are not "determined" and that the
company may change the rates upon giving the usual
statutory notice of thirty days without any application
being made to or approval granted by the Commission.
And it has also advised that where complaints against
increased rates have been withdrawn, with the approval
cf the Commission, -because the complainants and the
company had reached an amicable agreement whereby
the company reduced the proposed increased rate, that
such rate was not a "determined" rate.
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3. Some practioners before the Commission were
cf the opinion that the filing of a complaint against a
proposed increase in rates within the thirty days' period
cast the burden upon the public service company to
prove not only that the increased rates are just and
reasonable but also that all the allegations in the complaint are not true. This of course is not the law.
The Law is quite specific upon this mitter, and
provides :12
"at any such hearing involving any proposed increase in
any rate, the burden of proof to show that such increased rate is just and reasonable shall be upon the

public service company."

Nothing could be clearer therefore, that if a comlplaint alleges the proposed rates are not only unjust
and unreasonable, but also unjustly discriminatory and
unduly preferential, the buiden is upon the complainant
to prove that the rates are unjustly discriminatory and
unduly preferential. One of the basic principles of our
jurisprudence is that he who alleges certain matters to
be illegal must sustain the burden of proving his allegation. The Public Service Company Law relieves
the complainant of only a portion of that burden and in
only one instance, namely, of proving that the proposed
rates are in fact unjust and unreasonable. Hence the
conplainant must prove his other allegations to be true.
The same is true where suxch a complaint couples with
it allegations as to the unsatisfactory nature of the
service or the unreasonableness of the rules of the company.
The reason for compelling the public service company to prove the proposed rates are just and reasonable Was that the proof, if it existed, was in the possession of the company. The reasonableness of rates de12Article V, Section 4.
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pends, to a large extent, on the net return they will
yield to the company upon the fair value of its property. All the facts to show this are in the possession of
the company and it should produce them in support of
its proposed rates. This reason does not apply, however,
to the other allegations in the complaint. If the service
is in any particular unsatis.ahctory, tfhe complainant can
show this very readily. The company cannot anticipate
the specific attack. These facts are in the possession of
the complainant.
There is also another point to be mentioned here.
The Public Service Comrpany Law places the burden of
proving that "such increased rate is just and reasonable" upon the company only if and when the complaint
is filed within the thirty days' period, or if within that
period the Con:Vission upon its own motion proceeds to
investigate the propriety of such increase. If the complant as to reasonableness of the rate is filed after the
expiration of that period, the burden is upon the complainant to prove that the rate is unjust and unreasonable.
4. There is another erroneous opinion concerning
the powers of the Commission, and some companies for
a time were guilty of entertaining it. The opinion is,
that the ComanIssion investigates and affirmatively approves tfhe issue of stocks and bonds by a public service company.
While this is the law in sone jurisdictions 3 it is
not the law in Pennsylvania. There are two views as to
the method of regulating the issue of stocks and bonds
of public service companies.
One view is that no public service comipany should
be permitted to issue either stocks or bonds unless the
"3For instance, Ohio, New York,

Maryland and California.

Wisconsin,

New Jersey,

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

265

matter had been thoroughly investigated and approved
by the Commission. The reason which underlies this
view is, that inasmuch as the amount of the outstanding stocks and bonds is one of the elements to be considered in arriving at a fair rate value of the property,
the Commission should have strict supervision over the
increase of the capitalization or funded indebtedness,
and no increase should be allowed except with the Commission's express approval.
The other view is premised on the theory th.at the
value of the property upon which the public, service
company is enititled to a fair return is best obtained by
an engineering valuation of the property; while the
amount of the outstanding securities is some evidence
of the fair value, yet it is by no -means the best evidence. Under this view the Corrinlission is not so vitally
interested in the issue olf securities. In addition, those
who hold this view are in doubt as to the legal result
which will follow from the approval of an issue of securities by the Comimission. They argue that under the
Fourteenth Amendment there is at least a possibility of
the approval working an estoppel against the Commission. For example: A public service company has an
outstanding bond issue of $200,000. Today if that company needs an additional $100,000 to carry on its service, the Commission in approving this issue, concerning
which there is no doubt as to its bona fides, will also
be approving the prior issue of $200,000 over which it
had no control. At a later date, the Commission would
be seriously handicapped if an engineering valuation
showed that the fair rate value was only $200,000. The
security of tlhe bonds which the Commission had approvdd would be prejudiced by such a valuation. The
doubt as to the effect of such an approval arises from
the language of the Supreme Court of the United Sates
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in Willcox vs. Consolidated Gas Company. 14 In that case
a general statute of New York governing the consolidation of corporations, provided that the consolidation
agreement was to state the "amount of its capital
stock, which shall not be larger in amount than the
fair aggregate value of the property, franchises and
rights of such corporation." A gas company was formed by merger and consolidation under this statute and
fixed the value of all its franchises at nearly $8,000,000. In an attack upon the constitutionality of a later
ect which fixed its gas rates, the value of the company's
property upon which it was entitled to a fair return became material. The company claimed as an item of
value the amount of this frandhise value. Concerning
this claim the Supreme Court, bhrough Mr. Justice
Peckham, said
"at the time of the consolidation, the value of the
franchises of the constituent companies was fixed by
them at $7,181,000 and that amount formed part of the
capital of the complainant for which it issued stock.
The consolidation was affected pursuant to the state
statute. The state has never questioned the validity or
fairness of the valuation. Since the consolidation the
stock so issued has been dealt in up to the present time
as valid stock of the coisolidated company capitalized
pursuant to statute, at not more than the fair aggre'gate value of the property, franchises and rights, of
its constituent companies. The state should not now be
heard to question the value of the franchises at the time
of the consolidation."

Inasmuch as the value of the franchise was estimated by the owners themiselves without being subjected to any state supervision whatsoever, it seems exceedingly doubtful if the provisions of the general con14(1909) 212 U. S. 19, 53L. Ed. 383. See, however, an article
by the writer in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 64,
page 173, discussing this case.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

267

solidation statute should be 'held to operate as an estoppel against the state when the question of the rate value
of the property was raised directly. But the possibility
of such a question arising is to be avoided, and therefore the Comtmission sould not be placed in a situation
which may at -a later date estop it.
This latter view, called the "Hadley Plan" after
President Hadley of Yale University, was adoptel by
our legislature. Under this plan, a public service company may issue as large an amount of stocks or bonds
a- it can sell. The only requirement of the Law is that
the company
"shall file with the Commission on or prior to the date
of issuance * * * * * , a certificate to be known as a
Certificate of Notification * * * * * .1

If the company files the Certificate of Notification
with the Bureau of Accounts and Statistics of the Commission on or before the date it issues the new securities, it has complied with the law. There is no investigation or approval of the propriety of the issue by the
Conm-ission. This certificate is quite a formal docuinent and contains in detail the financial history of the
company, the purpose of the issue, the amount issued,
the price at which the securities are to be sold, all the
rights, prdferences and privileges the holders of the
securities obtain thereunder and other data. There is a
form for the issue of stock, and another for bonds. The
certificate is verified by the affidavit of the fiscal head
af the company.
It is quite obvious that such a method keeps the
Comnmission fully advised as to the financing of public
service companies. No company is likely to file a false
certifidate, not only because the officers in charge are
15Article HI, Section 4 (b).
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reputable business men, but also the criminal provisions of the Law are quite severe. This method accomplishes the same practical end as the other method,
-ithout raising the doubtful question of estoppel.
Of course, a public service company has the right
under the Law to apply to the Coimmssion for a Certificate of ValuationG before it issues its securities. If
it adopts this procedure it is not necessary for it to
file a Certificate of Notification for the securities covered by the Certificate of Valuation. To avoid the question of estoppel the IJaw specifically provides that the
Certificate of Valuatien1

"saall be deemed to certify only to the fact that said
securities were issued for money, labor done, or money
or property actually acquired;

* * * * *

neither shall

said Certificafe of Valuation be deemed to require the
Commission, in subsequently determining the rates to
be charged for the services of said public service company, to provide a rate which shall be sufficient to yield
a return on said securities."

Certificates of Valulation are not comaon, and the
prevalent method of issuing securities is by filing the
Certificate of, Notification prior to the date of issue.
The above are what the writer regards as the most
conscpicuous misconceptions of our regulatory law. He
has not attempted to discuss them exhaustively for
such a discussion is beyond scope of this article. He
does hope, however, that this article will lead the members of the Bar to study more carefully the provisions
ef this great statute and the reasons for its enactment,
for all can say with Lord Coke that
"The law is unknown to hi~m who knows not the reason thereof, and the known certainty of the law is for
the safety of all:"

DOUGLASS D. STOREY.
Dickinson School of Law
'6Article III, Section 4 (a).

17Article V, Section 21.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

269

MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH VS.

SOMERS.

Larceny-Joint Indictment--Separate Trials of Joint Defendants by the Same Jury on the Same Facts and WitnessesIncompetency of Juror to Serve in Bdith Trials-Challenge
for Cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Somers was indicted for larceny committed joint!y with X
and Y. X has been tried and found guilty. Some of the jurors in
X's case sat on that of Somers.' The same witnesses appeared in
both cases. The verdict was that Somers was guilty. Motion for
a new trial, because he was not tried by an impartial jury.
Delesantro for Plaintiff.
Fox for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
POLISHER, J.-The facts being rather vague, we are
forced to presume that the defendant's counsel challenged the
jurors in question before they were sworn, else there would be
no case, since the failure to challenge a juror before he is sworn
i. a waiver of the challenge, if the cause exists and is known before the swearing, as was the case here. 11 Pa. 325; 5 Binney
(Pa.) 339. Also, that the challenge was overruled.
The question to be decided is whether a juror, who has sat
in the case of a joint respondent based upon the same facts and
testimony of the very same witnesses whose credibility he has
already passed upon, is competent to act as a juror in the present case.
The only difference between the two cases,--namely, the trial
of the other co-perpetrator and the present case-is the substitution of the present defendant for the other defendant. The facts
are the same; the testimony establishing the facts is the same;
the questions involved are the same. The above difference-the
substitution of present defendant-is the only distingushing
feature between the two cases.
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The jurors in that case formed their opinion from the facts
else they would not have been able to render a verdict. One
opinion is applicable to one state of facts; sand only one.
The defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. The cause of challenge appears to have been that
the juror had, in effect, prejudged the case, or had contracted a
bias such as to interfere with an impartial judgment. The question is-has the defendant had an impartial trial? We think not.
In all the reported cases in this state, in which an alleged
prejudgment has been made the cause of challenge, the examination of the juror has shown nothing more than the formation of
an opinion from newspaper and other reports, or from reading
the testimony given on a previous hearing or trial. In such cases
the rule is well settled that "if from the examination of the
juror, it appears that he has the ability and disposition to render a verdict on the evidence alone, the law adjudges him to be
competent, notwithstanding it would require evidence to change
his impressions or opinions formed from what he had heard or
read about the affair under investigation;" 156 Pa. 304; 1V84 Pa.
274. An exception is, however, made of an opinion formed from
hearing or reading the evidence on both sides on a former trial;
"such knowledge excludes the idea of impartiality;" Allison
vs.
Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 17; Staup vs. Commonwealth, 74 Pa. 458;
Ortwein vs. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 414.
In Staup vs. Commonwealth, supra, the juror stated that
be had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant from reading the evidence on the previous trial but that
"it would not affect or influence his judgment, if sworn as a
jaror." The Supreme Court held him incompetent.
The exception is-if the opinion is formed from reading or
hearing evidence of both sides on a former trial. As was said before, the trial of the present defendant being so nearly identical
with the trial of his co-perpetrator, it might very easily and
reasonably be considered as a trial of the former case with the
prisoners changed. The jurors formed fixed opinions about that
case. The renewal of the facts necessitates a revival of the opinion formed thereof. It is highly improbable to suppose otherwise. The facts are a formula for the opinion; the opinion,
hence, is fixed, as to that state of facts; and fixed opinions entertained by a juror previous to his entering a jury box cannot be
taken off at will and hung up like an overcoat when he enters
upon the trial of the case. Jurors are but men and may be affected by a previously formed fixed opinion without intending or
even knowing it. Besides, few jurors are willing to acknowledge
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publicly that they cannot act impartially. The law wisely delivers
the accused from such peril. Stronger reasons for pronouncing a
juror disqualified by prejudgment have seldom been presented
than are shown in the present case.
In order to do justice to the defendant and conform with
the provision of the Constitution for a trial by an impartial
jury, we order a new trial since the jurors are incompetent and
the former trial partial.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME -COURT,
In Buck vs. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 486, A, jointly indicted
with B and C for highway robbery, was separately tried. He
challenged a juror on the ground that the latter had been a juror
in the case of Commonwealth vs. B, C and D, involving a different crime. The challenge was overruled because the former "was
a different case and involved an entirely different state of
facts;" that is, it was assumed that having found B and C guilty
of a different crime, would not deprive them of impartiality, on
the trial of A, charged with confederacy with B and C, in a different crime.
The objection to the jurors' impartiality here is, that they
have found X, an alleged confederate of Somers, in the theft
guilty, and that the same witnesses whom they decided to be
trustworthy in the trial of X, have testified against Somers, and
have been again adjudged trustworthy. Objections could have
been made by -a challenge, on the former ground, but not on the
latter, since it could not be foreseen what witnesses would be employed by the Commonwealth, in the trial of Somers. We think,
in order that the constitutional right of the, defendant, to an im-partial trial may be preserved, that objection to the use of the
same witnesses may be urged, on the motion for a new trial.
Possibly objection might have been made at the trial, to the
witnesses a they were called, on the ground that, as to this
case, before this jury, they were incompetent to testify. It
would be difficult, however, to discover in precedents, any authority for thus objecting to the witness.
Were the jurors impartial? Each juror must be impartial.
It is not enough that eleven are if the twelfth is not. One of the
jurors had heard the witnesses in the former case charge X and
Somers with the crime, and they believed them. We are not warranted in thinking that they believed these witnesses only in so
far as they incriminated X; and that they disbelieved them, or
at least did not believe them, when they connected Somers with
X in the crime.
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They have therefore found and in the solemn form of a
verdict, declared the opinion that X is guilty on the same evidence by the same witnesses, as -are now p'esented, in the trial
of Somers. How then can we evade the infcrence that they had
formed a fixed opinion as to Somers' guilt.
Having declared their belief of X's guilt, how can they fail
to do the same as to Somers? The former opinion must abide
with them, until overcome, but nothing has happened to overcome it. There has been a reiteration of the same testimony by
the same witnesses.
Even if the formation of an opinion, solemnly announced,
would not be an impediment to the formation of a different opinion, it is too much to expect in jurors the degree of courage that
would be implied, in convicting one man on certain evidence, and
in refusing to convict another man on the same evidence. The
desire to maintain an appearance of consistency, would be an
obstacle to impartial weighing of the evidence.
Paxson, J., expressed the judgment that, if a witness had
been present at a previous trial of a man and thus was in "pos- °
session of the whole case" such fact would "exclude the idea of
impartiality," Allison vs. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 17; Staup vs.
Commonwealth, 74 Pa. 458. Agnew, C. J., apparently thought that
an opinion formed upon the same evidence-substantially as will be
given upon the trial "will have such fixedness and strength, as
will probably influence and control the jurors' verdict," and divest
him of impartiality; Ortwein vs. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 414, 426.
Much more would the "idea of impartiality" be excluded, if the
juror had heard all the evidence in the earlier case and had expressed his inference from it in a verdict.
The same witnesses have appeared in both cases. They are
testifying to the same facts. The earlier verdict has expressed
the judgment of the jurors. Impartial as these were, at the first
trial, they are no longer so at the second trial. They approach
the second trial with conceptions already formed. They cannot
make an appraisal of the evidence heard now without prepossession.
We think the -able opinion of the learned court below has
properly disposed of the case. Cf. Priestly vs. Arizona, 177 Pacific 137; 3 A. L. R. 1201. The judgment must be
AFFIRMED.
FACKEL VS. COAL COMPANY
Subjacent Support-Time When the Statute of Limitations Begins to Run-Right of Action Arises When Support Removed
and Not When Subsidence Occurs.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Fackel owned farm land, underneath which was a stratum of
coal belonging to the defendant. The defendant excavated the
coal and as a result, the surface fell in at different places and
buildings on these places were demolished. The last act done by
defendant was done during February, 1912. The cave in did not
occur until April, 1915. This action was brought April 20, 1919.
The court refused to say that the Statute of Limitations barred
the action and permitted the plaintiff to recover. Motion for a
new trial by the defendant.
Bartram for Plaintiff.
'Coglizer for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SLOBRMIAN, J.-The only question involved in this case is
whether the owner of the surface is wronged, in legal contemplation, from the date when the owner of the subjacent coal
removes the coal without leaving sufficient support for the surface, or whether the tort dates only' from the date when the subsidence of the surface occurs. An explanation of the right of
support may aid in deciding this question.
The right of support is a right to the abstinence by the owner of the mine or lower stratum, from acts within -his mine, that
will affect the place of the upper stratum. It is a limit upon the
usual powers of an owner for the advantage of a superjacent
piece of land. This right exists whenever an upper and lower
segment of the earth falls into the ownership of different persons, irrespective of any intention on the part of either, contractually expressed, that it shall exist. This is an absolute right
arising out of the ownership of the surface. It is a common law
proprietary right. Robertson vs. Coal Company, 172 Pa. 566;
William vs. Hay, 120 Pa. 485; Penn Gas Coal Company vs. Versailles Coal Company, 131 Pa. 522; Niles vs. Penn Coal Company,
214 Pa. 547.
It is not necessary that defendant should have been negligent in his excavation or ndning in order to be Bable when his
work causes a subsidence of the surface, or in other words, the
taking away of all the supports or so much that what is left is
insufficient, without substitution of artificial props, pillars,
etc., is ipso facto negligent, or the caving in is in itself conclusive ,proof of negligence Pringle vs. Vesta Coal Company, 172
Pa. 438; Hill vs. Pardee, 148 Pa. 98; Jones vs. Wagner, 66 Pa.
429.
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Now it clearly appears from the facts, that the subsidence
was the result of the mining of the .underlying coal, which mining had been done by the defendant immediately beneath the lot
of the plaintiff; and that there had not been any mining done directly beneath the plaintiff's lot within six years from the commtencement of this action, since the last act was done February,
1912.
The facts in the case at bar are exactly identical with those
in Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, with which it is on all fours.
As this case will control the decision in the case at bar, it will
be advantageous to quote at large from the opinion in that case.
as rendered by Judge Dean: "A cause of action is that which
produces or effects the results complained of. The subjacent owner in this case, at some time falied in duty to the owner of the
surface of this lot. The mere fact that it caved in because the
coal had been mined underneath, demongtrates this failure. When
the coal was removed without leaving sufficient pillars or without
supplying sufficient artificial props was the time when the subjacent owner failed in an absolute duty he owed to his neighbor
above. And from that time dates the cause of action. This is the
case although the owner of the surface may have been ignorant
of the violation of his right to support."
The case of Lewey vs. Fricke, 166 Pa. 536, is clearly distinguishable from an action for failure to afford the support. In
that case the defendant from an adjoining mine, had mined and
removed the plaintiff's coal underneath his land, yet did not dis.
close the fact and plaintiff did not discover it until after six
years had run, and it was held that the Statute of Limitations
only began to run from the time of the plaintiff's discovery, because the mining of his coal was a wrong and the concealment
of the wrong a fraud. He had no means of discovery; had no
right of access to the mine to make observations and the defendant no right at all under his land; he had no reason to suspect
or presume, that one who had no claim of right would wrongfully enter on his land and dig coal. But in the case at bar, the
parties who mined the coal (as in Noonan vs. Pardee), had a
right to do so; the surface owner, too, had a right of sufficient
support; these mutual rights gave the surface owner access to
the mine to see that his right was being maintained by the per.
formance of the duty owing to him by the coal operator. The sur.
face owner should make constant tours of inspection, and the
courts will enforce this right of access if the mine operator denies it. So we must come to the inevitable conclusion, as laid
down in Noonan vs. Pardee, that the cause of action arose 'when
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the mine operator failed to furnish sufficient support. If the
subsidence is wholly due to the removal of coal six years before
suit is brought and failure then to leave sufficient support, (of
which there can be no doubt in the case at bar), the action
should have been barred and recovery refused. Since the mine
operator failed to furnish sufficient support, the right of action
was barred after the expiration of six years. The date of the
"cave in" is not the date of the cause of action; that is only the
consequence of a previous cause. There had been no mining under the plaintiff's land for more than six years; since the last act
of mrining was February 1912, and action brought April, 1919.
As a matter of fact, Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa. 274, is the
only case in Pennsylvania on this exact point, in which the
Statute of Limitations has been held to run not from the date of
subsidence but from the date of excavation. The right to support
in Pennsylvania is a right simply to have the surface supported
for six years after the removal of the coal.
Although the doctrine as laid down in Noonan vs. Pardee is
a poor one and rather exceptional, and different from the general rule as laid down in all other jurisdictions, yet, there is no
doubt as to its being the settled law in Pennsylvania. And as it
is a rather recent decision (1901), we feel bound to follow the
doctrine laid down, although it is not good law.
Our conclusion is, that the court erred in allowing the plaintiff to recover after the Statute of Limitations had run for six
sears. The motion for a new trial by the defendant should have
been granted.
Motion for a new trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It has been held by the Supreme Court, that, when support
to the surface is removed, the act of removal, and not the caving
in of the surface, which may not occur for 5, i0, 15 or 20 years
thereafter, is the cause of action. Noonan vs. Pardee, 200 Pa.
474; Fischler vs. Pennsylvania Coal Company, 218 Pa. 82.
The inference is drawn that the action by the surface owner,
must be brought within six years from the occurrence of this
cause.
Strange to say, Noonan vs. Pardee, alleges that the cause is
not a cause. It asserts that an action cannot be brought for a
vithdrawal of the support, until the actual caving in so that, if
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that caving in does not occur till six years from the ablation of
support, there never can be a successful suit.
The case also says that, not the owner of the land, when
the cause of action arises, viz, the withdrawal of support, can
sue, but only the owner, when the cavein occurs.
This decision has awakened astonishment in two hemispheres, but it has not been retracted. The learned court below
has submitted to it. We must do likewise. The judgment is
AFFIRMED.
COMMONWEALTH VS. CONWAY.
Larceny-Evidence-Admissibility of Evidence of Former Similar Crime-Possession of Another's Property as Evidence of
Larceny-Poverty of Defendant as Motive for Larceny.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Indictment for larceny from X's house. A week after the
theft several things, such as -watches, gold chains, cuff buttons,
ets., were found upon Conway's person. But none of these things
,were stolen from X's house. Objection was made to the introduction of this evidence.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
HAND, J.-It is the opinion of the court that the objection
must be sustained. Such evidence is admissible -if it tends to
prove the issue or constitutes a link in the chain of proof. In
this case it clearly does neither. This rule excludes all evidence
of collateral facts, or those which are incapable of affording any
reasonable presumption or inference as to principal facts. In this
case the fact that the defendant had jewelry on his person a
week after the alleged offense, and none which having been stolen
from the house mentioned in the indictment certainly affords no
such reasonable presumption.
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Haines, 257 -Pa. 289, which
was decided in 1917, Justice Mestrezat said: "It is fundamental
that a defendant can not be convicted of an offense with which
he is charged because he had committed another offense unconrected with that for which he is indicted and evidence of his participation in another crime is inadmissable unless such close connection can be shown that if the defendant is guilty of one lie is
also guilty of the other."
The general rule is that on prosecution for a particular
crime, evidence whith in any manner shows or tends to show
that the accused has committed another crime wholly independ-
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ent of that for which he is on trial even though it be a crime of
the some sort is irrelevant and inadmissable. Commonwealth vs.
Biddle, 200 Pa. 647; Commonwealth vs. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1; Commonwealth vs. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. 554.
If the evidence forms part of the same transaction or is
used to show knowledge, intent or identity of the defendant it
is admissible. But the evidence of this case was not used for
any of these purposes. In Comonwealth vs. Saulsbury, Chief
Justice Paxson said: "Evidence proving a previous commission of
an offense of the same nature must be excluded."
In Commonwealth vs. Wilson, 40 Atl. 283, it was held that
evidence of another crime establishing connection with the crime
in the indictment was admissible; but Williams, J., said, "the
admission of testimony of witnesses called to prove an attempt
by the defendant to rob one Swab, the said occurrence happening
three weeks after the indictment, will be rejected."
It is an established rule governing the production of evidence that the evidence offered must correspond with the allegations and be confined to the point. 10 R. C. L. 927. See also to
this effect Taylor on Evidence 230 and Greenleaf on Evidence,
par. 50 and 51.
The plaintiff cites iState vs. Wilson, 84 Pac. 409. This case
dealt with the shifting of burden of proof when cattle were found
in the possession of the alleged thief and with evidence received
from a bribed jury. The Commonwealth also cites Walker vs.
State, 127 Ga. 48. This case dealth with forgery. Neither case is
analagous with the case at bar.
It is clear that such evidence as the prosecutor here attempted to introduce cannot be admitted unless (1) it tends to show
connection with the crinme in the indictment; (2) it forms a part
of the same transaction or (3) it tends to show knowledge, intent or the identity of the defendant. It is clear that the evidence that the prosecutor attempted
to introduce, comes
under none of these three heads. Were it admitted it
would tend to draw the minds of the jurors away
from the point in issue and to excite prejudice -against
the
defendant.
Another
reason
is
that
the
adverse
party having no notice of such evidence would not be prepared to rebut it. It would destroy the presumption in the minds
of the jury that, in respect to the -particular crime in the indict.
ment the defendant is innocent until he is shown guilty by proof
of facts alleged in said indictment.
Objection sustained.
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Watches, gold chains, cuff buttons, etc., were found on Conway's premises. Were they legitimately acquired or not? If leg1timately, the finding of them could have no value, in this investigation. If there was evidence, not disclosed in the case
stated, of the poverty of Conway, f his having no remunerative
work, so that his possession of such articles would justify a
suspicion of their having been stolen, that possession would tend
to prove, associated with other evidence, that those articles had
been stolen by Conway.
But, let us suppose that we had more than a suspicion of the
theft of these articles, that the evidence warranted the belief of
such theft, would such evidence be admitted in the present case?
It would show that Conway had probably stolen these articles.
But, can we show that the defendant has committed one theft,
in order to show a larcenous disposition? Nothing is better settled that we cannot. If indeed, we know that a man has stolen
once, it is easier to believe that he has been the thief, when
something else has been stolen. But the state denies to itself the
use of proof of one crime, in order to establish the commission
of another, in this way.
So far as we can see, no other was intended to be made by
the jury of the supposititious theft of the gold chains, etc., as a
basis of inference that the defendant probably committed the
theft from X's house. Henry Pa. Trial Evidence, p. 39. Such use
is inadmissible.
:Our attention has been called to Massachusetts vs. Coyne,
228 Mass. 269; 117 N. E. 337, in which evidence similar to that
offered in this case was given. With all. that is said therein, we
cannot concur. The only apparent object of the evidence here,
'was to suggest that another theft had .been committed by the defendant and that was an illegitimate one.
We must, therefore, agree with the learned court below and
its judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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BOWMAN'S ESTATE
Ejectment-Joint Executors-Joinder of all Executors Necessary
'to Pass Good Title to Decedent's Real Estate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Bowman by will directed that his son, John, should occupy
his house until such time as his executors (three in number)
should make sale of it. Two years after his death, two of these
executors conveyed the house to X, without the co-operation or
consent of the third executor. X took possession, expelling John,
who brings this ejectment to recover possession.
Shutter for Plaintiff.
Phillips for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SCH IIEE, J.-The principal question presented by the above
case has either been overlooked or evaded by the learned counsel for the defendant, who contends that the sale by two or
three executors to the defendant vested the title in the latter.
It was well established at common law, and it is likewise
true today, that upon the death of an owner of real estate, the
title of the owner vested at once in the heirs or residuary legatees. Accordingly, an executor or administrator, as such, could
not maintain a real action to recover possession of the land of
the deceased. (4 Mass. 356; 32 Pa. 495.)
The facts in the above case warrant the belief that the
executors were entrusted with the bare power of sale only, title
remaining in the heir who was "diTected * * * * * to occupy the
house until such time as his executors should make sale of it."
The language above quoted shows the primary intent of
the testator to have the possession of the house and title thereto
vezted in the son until such time as the executors, by their act
in selling the property, should divest the title and possession
from the son. To illustrate the logic of this conclusion: If the
executors never sold the property, there would be no person or
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persons in existence who could dispute the title of the son,
John. The deceased did not vest title in the executors with the
power of sale, but merely left the title in the possession that
it would have been in the absence of the power given to the executors to sell, viz., in his heir. The power given to the executors -to sell the property merely gave them the right to alienate
the title from the son.
The rule is well settled that where a testator authorizes his
executors to sell and convey lands, without specifically empowering anyone or any part of the executors to severally convey
the lands, a deed not executed by all of the executors does not
convey a valid title. In most cases, the testator appoints several
executors with the express purpose of -having them act jointly
only, so that the estate will derive the benefits of the check in
balance, which would naturally operate where there were two
or more persons; so that before any definite action could be
taken, the concurrence of all of the executors would have to be
secured.
The following cases have held that where a power of sale is
vested in executors, all of the executors must join in the conveyance, unless their renunciation appear of record: 92 Pa. 221;
254 Pa. 231; 4 Ky. 484; Section 28 (D of the Fiduciaries Act).
When executors are given a mere porwer of sale of realty
without being given the title to it, the title vests in the heir or
residuary devisee, until a valid sale is affectuated. 105 N. Y.
185; Tiffany, page 605.
Without the joinder of the third executor in the case before
the, court, no title therefore passed to the defendant, inasmuch
as title remained in the plaintiff until properly and legally divested from him by a valid sale of the executors, and no such
sale 'being present in the above case, the action of the plaintiff
is proper and he alone can successfully prosecute the action of
ejectment.
The court is of the opinion that the counsel for the defendant has misconstrued section 28a of the Fiduciaries Act. This
section is applicable to sales and conveyances only and when
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properly made by all of the executors. It therefore has no application to the case at bar.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREIME COURT.
There were three executors. They, the three, were to make
sale, if sale was made at all. It must be assumed, said the court
in a similar case, from the appointment of a man as one of three
executors, that the testator "reposed confidence in his judgment
and business capacity," and desired that he "should participate
in fixing the price and securing a purchaser for the real estate."
Simmons Estate, 254 Pa. 231.
TIhe sale by two only of the executors is therefore void. The
decedent's Will says that John shall occupy the house until the
sale shall be made by th executors. The valid sale has not yet
been maade. The purchaser at the invalid sale, has acquired no
right whatever, to the land. His ouster of John is without law.
Jn this ejectment, John must, as has decided the learned court
below, recover. The judgment is.
AFFIRMED.

